Ours is indeed an age of extremity. For we live under continual threat of two equally fearful, but seemingly opposed destinies: unremitting banality and inconceivable terror. (Susan Sontag 42)

Globalization and the new global order associated with it have engendered a plethora of studies pointing to the disparities, polarities, inequalities, indeed to the ethnic rifts constitutive of it. In the following, I posit that while globalization as an economic and cultural phenomenon has received overwhelming attention, globalism as an ideology and the accompanying rhetoric of globalization are yet to be grappled with. It is outside the scope of the present enquiry to add to the profusion of bibliography on globalization. Rather, my interest here lies in global cultural production and its articulations with global economy, the pursuit being geared towards an exploration of the structures of the global imagination, or what, for the purposes of the current endeavor, we have termed the ‘global order of the image.’ Within the cultural dynamics of globalization, I envision dystopia as a natural (dis)order of the global world, intrinsically linked with the doctrines of globalism and capitalism, and their totalizing narratives. As such it is the globalism-dystopianism equation and its bearing on the dystopian imaginarius that I find to be of utmost significance. Whereas confident that a typology of global dystopian narratives can be assembled, and that it can in itself yield to insightful analyses of the apocalyptic present, at this stage of research I find it more productive to look at the epistemology of disaster rather than at its aesthetics or axiology. In defining the concept of the global imaginary, I start from the seminal model of the “regime of the imagination” contributed by French anthropologist Gilbert Durand. In the Durandian vision, the disposition of imaginary elements is in accordance with a set of grammatical principles and regularities pertaining to the faculty of imagination and the repertoire of motifs that determine what is ‘imaginable’ for a given individual or collective subjectivity. Building on Durand’s interpretive model, I propose a reading of the social imaginary of globality as indicative of the ‘collective nightmares’ embedded in the post-capitalist society.
About half a century ago, American critic Susan Sontag spoke of an ‘age of extremity,’ whereby disaster was no longer the province of fantasy, as was the case of previous, sci-fi productions, but manifest, inescapable, ‘real’ and ‘present.’ To the extent that it imbues the imminence and immediacy of disaster, global culture is both a ‘culture apocalypse’ and an ‘apocalyptic culture,’ its cultural imaginings and projections forming a ‘tropology’ of what may be termed ‘post-apocalyptic fiction.’ Integral to the global condition, apocalypticism thus configures itself as an all-pervasive, defining sensibility of the global order, foregrounding what Evan Calder Williams envisages as the apocalyptic fantasies of late capitalism:

[...] there is a structure of feeling and a repetition of content wound through the cultural production of certain periods that is fundamentally apocalyptic: a deep-seated conviction that things are teetering on a precipice, that disaster is not just around the corner but that the corner has already been turned. Now is one of those times. The anxiety and urgency are palpable, and not just because movies about the dead returning to life and waging war on us all are making a killing at the box office. We stand on the nervous razour edge of bad years bound to go worse, if we don’t intervene, and we can’t help but feel this. (Williams 11)

Apocalyptic thinking, it can be argued, has been a marked propensity of all ages, a trait in-built in the human mind, humankind depending on end-of-the-world narratives for its sense of reality. Religious and secular apocalyptic visions are ingrained in the cognitive structures underlying various belief systems. Going beyond the mere description of patterns of destruction and rebirth, these visions cohere, playing a systemic role in the representation of the world. Consequently, apocalyptic renditions are the natural appanage of imagination, shaping our construction of reality. Where the post-apocalyptic strain differs from apocalyptic representations lies the crux of the global landscape, indeed of the global order of the image. According to Williams, capitalist apocalypse is “distinct from other modes of collapse, decay, decline, or disaster,” devoid as it is of the redeeming dimensions of revelation:

Apocalypse—specifically capitalist apocalypse—needs to be understood in distinction from crisis and catastrophe. A crisis is a cyclical, expected expression, not a permanent state of affairs. It will pass, and be passed through. It will pass, and be passed through, clearing out systemic dead wood along the way. And it is not an end in itself. A crisis might be read as threatening times of non-recovery to come, but those are the times when it can no longer be called a ‘crisis.’ Catastrophe, on the other hand, is end without revelation, a historical void, an end of the road that cannot point beyond itself. Worse, if it does point elsewhere, it is to a post-world nostalgic and desperate to shore up the remnants of its outmoded status quo. Catastrophe in the imaginary of our time, is more than just the fears and predictions of global warming, flu pandemic, or peak oil. There is a likelihood in which the general contraction and decline of late capitalism into its sticky frantic state now will, over the next decades, become statically catastrophic. (Williams 11)
While adhering to Williams’s theory of the late capitalist imaginary as pathologically immobilized in an irredeemable, eternal present, in my view, a far more crucial distinction to be traced is that between the apocalyptic and the post-apocalyptic imaginary, whereby “post” is not a mere periodical marker, but the indicator of a major change in the poetics of disaster. It is a distinction Jesse Kavadlo traces in “Apocalypse and Amnesia in Film and The Road” an insightful reading of 9/11 as a periodical marker in cinematic productions. Epitomizing the cultural logic of globality, late capitalism is par excellence an age of relentless, cumulative and, above all, systemic crisis, illustrative of a global order gone terribly wrong.

It is my contention that whereas capitalist apocalypse is a reflection on and of futurity, defined by the anticipation of disaster, global post-apocalypse—the unadulterated expression of which is posthumanism as a mindset—is an ‘afterthought’ articulated in the ‘day after tomorrow,’ on a disaster that has already taken place. Post 9/11, the global individual lives in an apocalyptic present, in the aftermath of an ongoing financial crisis, cataclysm, terror, mass extinction, and, above all, in a state of perpetual, paralyzing, visceral fear. To the global subject, the apocalypse is thus no longer a projection, nor is it the expression of some ‘doomsday cults’ propounding fanciful visions of a future of precarity. For while the realization of living in a ‘collapsing era’ has accompanied the postlapsarian man throughout culture history, in the eternal, apocalyptic present inhabited by the global individual, the world has already succumbed to all manner of destruction, be that barbarianism, the demographic time-bomb, environmental devastation, the refugee invasion, or surveillance mechanisms. In a self-consumptive age of surveillance, plagued by immigration, the ‘war on terror,’ end times tweets, as well as a growing nostalgia over the analogue, digital dystopia is a thing already ‘consumed.’ In the risk society of the global subject, anxiety is no longer irrational, but very much ‘real’ and well-founded. No longer a prophecy of an impending doom, post-apocalypse disaster is a reality experienced first-hand, as an integral part of the present, indeed as inherent in the very structures of globality, with global fluidity as catalyst to a ‘new order of uncertainty’ that is not even unsettling anymore, for to the global man, the future will have already ‘happened’:

The speed and intensity with which both material and ideological elements now circulate across national boundaries have created a new order of uncertainty in social life. Whatever may characterize this new kind of uncertainty, it does not easily fit the dominant, Weberian prophecy about modernity in which earlier, intimate social forms would dissolve, to be replaced by highly regimented bureaucratic-legal orders governed by the growth of procedure and predictability. The forms of such uncertainty are certainly various. One kind of uncertainty is a direct reflection of census concerns: how many persons of this or that sort really exist in a given territory? Or, in the context of rapid migration or refugee movement, how many of “them” are there now among us? Another kind of uncertainty is about what some of these mega identities really mean: for example, what are the normative characteristics of what the constitution defines as a member of an OBC (Other Backward Caste) in India? […] Where one or more of these forms of social uncertainty come into play, violence can create a macabre form of certainty and can become a
brutal technique or folk discovery-procedure about “them” and, therefore, about “us.” This volatile relationship between certainty and uncertainty might make special sense in the era of globalization. (Appadurai 2006: 15-6)

To a great extent, the condition of uncertainty makes the post-apocalypse partake of the very cognitive and cultural formations of the global, a “grand narrative” of the end, played out on a horizon of expectation that is past the gloom and doom, in which humans are no longer the main “perpetrator,” but an endangered species, awaiting animals and the “undead” to take over. It is a narrative that not only typifies, but is genuinely congenial to the global imaginary. Far from the ‘end of literature,’ indeed of imagination itself, the posthumanist phase of the global imaginary thrives on the acquiescence of a nearing, incontrovertible, ‘non-terminal’ end, hence the huge proliferation of dystopian productions post 9/11. In the multi-centric world of global hegemonies, elites and polarities, one thus witnesses implicitly an unparalleled commodification of disaster, a flurry of ‘dystopian activity,’ celebrating the ‘last man,’ the end of times and the end of human civilization as we know it. Ultimately, global fear is the by-product of the so-called universalization processes embedded in globalization, processes that, in late capitalism, shape out as exchanges versus values, rather than ‘exchange values,’ fueling a ‘perpetual flow of money,’ promoting dislocation in the guise of localization, and what Baudrillard described as the “violence of the global,” the end of value systems; hence the rise of dystopianism—a felt ultimacy in a perpetually present, futureless world:

Today’s terrorism is not the product of a traditional history of anarchism, nihilism, or fanaticism. It is instead the contemporary partner of globalization. To identify its main features, it is necessary to perform a brief genealogy of globalization, particularly of its relationship to the singular and the universal. The analogy between the terms “global” and “universal” is misleading. Universalization has to do with human rights, liberty, culture, and democracy. By contrast, globalization is about technology, the market, tourism, and information. Globalization appears to be irreversible whereas universalization is likely to be on its way out. At least, it appears to be retreating as a value system which developed in the context of Western modernity and was unmatched by any other culture. Any culture that becomes universal loses its singularity and dies. That’s what happened to all those cultures we destroyed by forcefully assimilating them. But it is also true of our own culture, despite its claim of being universally valid. The only difference is that other cultures died because of their singularity, which is a beautiful death. We are dying because we are losing our own singularity and exterminating all our values. And this is a much more ugly death. (Baudrillard 2003)

Although Armageddon fantasies (particularly in their nuclear guise) are a highly pervasive theme of the post-holocaust imagination, the fixation with apocalypse finds itself at the heart of the globalism-dystopianism collusion, a fixation stemming organically from the rhetoric of globalization and from the innate inclination of the global mind, its natural disposition toward apprehensions and catastrophic imaginings, the “deadness and brokenness of an era,” as Williams aptly points out (11):
At the emergent moments of what would come to be called neoliberalism, both its apologists and its antagonistic symptoms—punk—declared there was no future: just the eternal present of this world declaring itself to be the only show in town, even as it veered off the rails. The situation to come is a different no future, the slow entropic loss of energy and profit, coupled with the state’s brutal refusal—demanding the same of its citizens and subjects—to acknowledge that the eternal present has become an eternal past. (Williams 11)

To seek to define the global order of the image is thus to take stock of this explosive, lethal interaction between globalism and the social imaginary, and in so doing, move beyond the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ paradigm of postcolonial theory, that, as global theorist Arjun Appadurai signals, can no longer account for the new cultural economy:

The new global cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even those that might account for multiple centers and peripheries). Nor is it susceptible to simple models of push and pull in terms of migration theory), or of surpluses and deficits (as in traditional models of balance and trade), or of consumers and producers (as in most neo-Marxist theories of development). Even the most complex and flexible theories of global development that have come out of the Marxist tradition (Amin 1980; Mandel 1978; Wallerstein 1974; Wolf, 1982) are inadequately quirky and have failed to come to terms with what Scott Lash and John Urry have called disorganized capitalism (1987). The complexity of the current global economy has to do with certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics that we have only begun to theorize. (Appadurai 1996: 33)

In his attempt to factor in the logic of the new global cultural economy, Appadurai resorts to the concepts of ‘ethnoscapes,’ ‘mediascapes,’ ‘technoscapes,’ ‘financescapes’ and ‘ideoscapes,’ terms that he coins to describe global mobility and the global flows. Avoiding monolithic approaches to the global condition, Appadurai thus addresses what he terms “the darker sides of globalization,” i.e. an entire panorama of violence, exclusion, destruction, ethnocide and enormity from ethnic cleansing to terror, pandemics and the migrant crisis. Appadurai’s deconstruction, indeed defamiliarization of the new global cultural dynamics, provides an insightful vision of the tribulations of late capitalism, from ‘high globalization’ to recent developments, i.e. from the flow of capital to the flow of people:

So we are forced to ask and answer the question about why the 1990s, the period of what we may now call “high globalization,” should also be the period of large-scale violence in a wide range of societies and political regimes? In referring to high globalization (with more than a gesture to high modernism), I flag a set of utopian possibilities and projects that swept many countries, states, and public spheres after the end of the Cold War. These possibilities were captured in a series of intertwined doctrines about open markets and free trade, about the powerful
possibilities of the Internet (and related cyber technologies) to mitigate inequality both within and across societies and to increase freedom, transparency, and good governance in even the poorest and most isolated countries. Today, only the most fundamentalist supporters of unfettered economic globalization assume that the domino effects of free trade and high degrees of cross-national market integration and capital flow are always positive. (Appadurai 2006: 12)

What then of the turn of the third millennium sensibility and its reverberations in cinematic imagination? What are the major dystopian departures since the “prelapsarian,” classic sci-fi productions of Andrey Tarkovsky’s Solaris (1972) and Stanley Kubrik’s Odyssey 2001 (1968)? To begin with, one notices that in post 9/11 context, survivalist fictions have from very early on become mainstream, branching off in a host of genres and sub-genres, dystopian categories and sub-categories, with the zombie apocalypse movies as a major cinematic dominant, the category outnumbering by far that of eco-apocalypse. An ‘appraisal’ or celebration of disaster, it has to be said, is prevalent in the global cinematic dystopias, the post-human horizon of which is by far the most unsettling. Zombies and zombielands loom large in the horizon of the global imaginary, featuring ‘unheaded hordes’ of the “undead,” forming a ‘greatest hits’ collection of zombie nightmares, zombie uprisings, and zombie rages. And whereas zombie movies have been in the picture for almost a century, the global zombie dystopia distinguishes itself by configuring an anti-post-human horizon of expectation, defying anything that sci-fi or salvage punk may have previously shown us. This is a visual rhetoric that obliterates the symbolical, by making it undecipherable and imperceptible. It is a rhetoric that provides a revealing term of comparison for the ‘old world’ and ‘new world’ zombyism. Implicitly, it follows that, while Durand envisages the symbolic and the real as distinct albeit synergic categories, in the imbricated global imaginary, the distinction has been effaced, the two having become almost indistinguishable. Or else, welcome to the posthuman order!

By posthuman I mean the narrative of the end of the anthropocene as portrayed in the zombie-apocalypse—thus literally the end of human dominance. But this cinematic tradition has regained popularity as a reaction to our networked condition. Therefore I refer also to the philosophical tradition that describes humans as transformed by technology. As a disruption of humanism, posthumanism is concerned with cybernetic advances and hybridity. For N. Katherine Hayles the dream is of a posthuman who “embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one of which we depend for our continued survival. (Gomez 2)

Part of the nocturnal order of the psyche, ‘new zombyism’ is about the angst experienced by the global subject before the prospect of the extinction of the human race; the nostalgia over the human legacy, or else, the ‘remains of the present.’ For in global capitalism, after all the waste and the hedonistic gratification of the senses, there sets in a sense of incontrovertible finitude:
The zombie of *The Walking Dead* is informed by George A. Romero’s original trilogy. But, unlike *The Night of the Living Dead*’s critique of American hubris in Vietnam and civil unrest at home, *The Walking Dead* ignores even slight socio-political critiques, only touching on issues of power. Instead, it is a tale of the ancient tragedy of fallen man. Since the rhetoric of transhumanism applies to universal human nature, there is no room for politics. Moving beyond Romero’s satellite and radio broadcast culture, *The Walking Dead* is filmed during an era of full immersion in the network of the expansionist Internet adaptation of Richard Dawkins’ evolutionary cultural phenomenon, the *meme* and its extension to “friendship.” We are part of the network and we are the network. We are potentially viral, and in our confusion we seek others by consuming virtual bodies. Most contemporary zombies storylines revolve around a similar struggle of the one versus the many. We are alone together. (Gomez 3)

A perfect illustration of global, transhumanist anxiety, Danny Boyle’s *28 Days Later* (2002) is an iconic viral-zombie film, perhaps one of the most cohesively thematized in an otherwise highly prolific genre. A tale of survival, exploring the final frontier of human civilization, it builds on the motif of the viral outbreak, to depict naturalistic indeed gory scenes of the predicament of a handful of individuals quarantined in a world inhabited by hordes of mindless zombies. The film opens with a group of animal activists invading a laboratory in Cambridge in order to release captive chimpanzees that were being experimented upon, in the process, unleashing a virus that causes rage. The ensuing images consist in a series of travelogues picturing a frozen, deserted city of London struck by the rage virus. The title makes reference to the lapse of time Jim, the protagonist, spends in a coma in a derelict hospital after the expulsion of the virus. The uninfected Selena and Mark rescue Jim from the hordes and bring him up to speed on the enormity of the devastation scale. Together, they fight for their lives, a gory, fierce battle of death and survival that brings out the best and the worst in them. With all of London ravaged by endless cohorts of zombies, the characters head outside, in a desperate attempt to find a disease-free, safe haven, painfully aware that the virus may have spread worldwide. In their peregrinations, as they discover several more survivors, they reach a fortified mansion, the closest they get to taking refuge from societal collapse, the lethal contagion, and the living dead. One of the themes the film invites reflection on is the vacuity of power and governance in extreme conditions and the anomic that it leads to:

*Jim:* Where is the government?
*Steve:* There is no government, everybody’s dead!
*Jim:* What do you mean there is no government? There is always a government!

(Garland 32)

In post-conflict, post-apocalypse times, whatever neo-liberal version of the distribution of state function one may have previously entertained, it will be obliterated, removed from cognition and memory, the same way values such as fraternity, altruism, compassion fade away. Hence the intimations of commanding officer Major Henry West on
collective decision toward disaster-risk reduction, viral decimation and the sheer horror:

You know what I see? I see people killing people; and I saw that the day before yesterday and the day before that and all of my life. It’s just people killing people. (Garland 95)

In fact West and most of his acolytes, as it turns out, prove only too eager to abandon their human values, and, soon enough, it is revealed that, rather than the result of a global pandemic event, it is Britain which is being quarantined, an old insularity cultural syndrome being reiterated here. All credit to film director Boyle who creates a disturbing, deeply believable post-apocalyptic picture of humanities in ruins, torn between mass carnage and a horrifying epidemic. For all its clichés and reliance on special effects, 28 Days Later is an impactful, ‘hit movie,’ insightful and revealing of the savage nature of mankind. It unfolds a plausible, credible case scenario of bio-chemical, engineered or terrorist hazard nightmare, foregrounding some of global man’s worst fears, fear of peril, dehumanization, animal conquest and disease. It is as well not lacking in authenticity, the zombyism phenomenon and its distinct physicality being rendered by virtue of recourse to performing athletes cast as the infected. Unsurprisingly, the cardinal rules and principles of Columbus—a character from an alternative zombie film, Zombieland (2009)—i.e. lots of cardio strength for the survival of the fittest, apply.

In the generic range of pre 9/11 apocalypse, the recurrent metaphor of the undead translates perfectly into fear of the end of the world, the demise of the human race, worse still, into a possible afterlife in undifferentiated, beastly shape. This is what makes for a riveting, compelling narrative from the director of Trainspotting (1996) and Slumdog Millionaire (2008). Inspiring and nuanced by its sequel 28 Weeks Later (2007) and the novel 28 Days Later: The Aftermath (2007) by Steve Mills, which develop and refine the post-viral theme, taking genetic modification and eco-terrorism further, to incorporate anthrax, foot-and-mouth disease, SARS, avian flu, and Ebola, 28 Days Later (2002) is one in a series of illustrations of planetary catastrophe, a production shedding light on global man’s insatiable appetite for disaster. In this day and age of biometrics, fingerprint scanning technology, of Apple Pay, drones (hovering robot reporters or remote video recording), and 3D, planetary catastrophe is the hubris that the Anthropocene expiates from in a troubled, Earth history of mass extinction featuring humans as the top predators.

Granted, against the backdrop of the global cultural ‘technosphere,’ one is bound to create one’s own ‘listopia,’ featuring one’s ‘preferred’ cinematic representations of disaster. Of the variegated cycles of posthuman films in circulation, The Purge series—I (2013), The Purge: Anarchy (2014) and The Purge: Election Year (2016)—is by far the most disquieting, unnerving and traumatizing expression of global dystopianism in its most ‘flamboyant,’ psychotic form. Cast in the mold of a depthless, ‘harmless’ horror-thriller film, it projects an eerie, near future society in which US population has reached a flourishing, crimeless stage of economic boom, unemployment is down to a staggering 1 %, and inequality appears to have been eradicated. It all comes at a price: one night
each year, all crime is legalized, citizens being instigated to proceed freely to all manner of wrongdoings, to ‘celebrate’ a ‘reborn America’ and her ‘new founding fathers.’ The ‘purge’ unleashes the killing instincts in individual, enabling a whole nation to work through its sick, troubled impulses and frustrations. Courtesy of global mobility, it is not just the locals that benefit from the purge ritual. Travelers from worldwide flock to the “land of freedom” on the one night a year when all crime becomes legal, for their share in the annual 12-hour interval, to get their chance to “purge.” While it can be argued that the film pushes the dystopian ‘global cultural logic’ to ‘breaking point,’ read against the Americans’ morbid obsession with gun power, the mass shootings, social justice warrior phenomenon and the extremes of the ongoing presidential elections, the dystopian material in The Purge sadly hardly strikes as futuristic. Rather, it taps into in-built, atavistic reservoirs of violence begging the question: ‘what if? What if for an annual 12-hour interval, Americans and other global citizens would turn into ‘purgers,’ wearing freaky masks, armed to the teeth, and setting out on a killing spree? What if one’s own neighbor, disguised as skinhead, mercenary, gang member, or simply wearing his/her ‘angry’ individual ‘hat’ were to engage in performing the deadliest ritual ever? And how would one survive Purge Night? Despite its ‘down-to-earth’ mode of rendition, the film is not devoid of the symbolical register. Purge Night is, as it happens, the night from 21 to 22 March, the night before the spring equinox, a moment in time associated with rebirth and renewal, purging being about cleansing, devious, congenital disorders. In its underlying themes, the film delves deep into atavistic motifs, built-in the collective American imaginary, proving more revealing of the global imaginary than it originally announced.

Deceptively fleeting at times, yet ahead of its more stable, conventional bedfellow, the novel, more permeable to a rapidly changing realm of perception while, at the same time, more immediately reflective of the horizon of expectation, popular culture is a receptacle of the ‘cultural scripts’ inscribed in the global post-apocalypse. Exhibitive, and easily dismissed as ‘frivolous,’ the medium of the film is nevertheless more culturally impregnable, and therefore more symptomatic of the ailments reverberating on the structures of the global imagination. Both diagnostic and prognostic, easily picking up on and taking pathologies further, global cinema provides an invaluable insight into the current, posthuman phase of dystopia, in so doing, inevitably shedding light on to what it is that is ‘eating up’ the global man.

References


**Abstract**

Post-Apocalypse Now: Globalism, Posthumanism, and the ‘Imagination of Disaster’

The paper examines post-apocalyptic representations in American film productions from a perspective informed by global and hypermodern cultural theory. It is an enquiry into aspects of dystopian sensibility in global cinema seen as manifest in several prominent genres of the post-apocalyptic strand. It is premised on the assumption that global society is endemically one marred by a catastrophic horizon of expectation, whose most congenial form of expression is dystopia, a genre on the rise worldwide, especially productive in Anglo-American cinematic practice. The chief scope of the investigation is to identify the articulations between ‘posthumanism’—construed as both ideology and sensibility—and the global anxieties as reflected in the post-9/11 cinematic imaginary. Drawing on Paul Virilio’s hypermodern and Arjun Appadurai’s and Thomas Turino’s global cultural theories, I seek to bring these dominants to bear on what I construe as globality’s post-apocalyptic imagination.

**Keywords**
Dystopia, apocalypticism, 9/11, cinema, global order, Zombyism, global theory, hypermodernitiy, disjuncture.